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Coping With Revenue Ruling 83-46:
Exploring Alternatives to the Pool
of Capital Theory
Rodger Curnow*
The current depression in the oil and gas industry is having
a severe impact upon small independentoil companies and wildcatters. By issuing Revenue Ruling 83-46, the InternalRevenue Service is adding to their difficulties by challengingthe long-standing
common law doctrine that a contributorof services to the acquisition or development of an oil and gas prospect in return for an
economic interest does not realize income until and unless production is attained In this articlethe author examines the possibilities
for mitigation or circumvention of the Ruling through the use of
alternative business associations.The articlespecifically focuses
upon the partnershiprelation and concludes that it is feasible to
form partnerships under the Uniform PartnershipAct and sufficient for purposes of SubchapterK of the InternalRevenue Code
which would bypass the Ruling's tax consequences. The article
then offers specific recommendationson how to structurethe partnership deal.
Revenue Ruling 83-461 has caused widespread concern in the oil and
2
gas industry because it purports to include the value of overriding royalty
interests in gross income in three situations where the venerable "pool
© Copyright 1987, University of Wyoming. See copyright notice at the beginning of
this issue.
* Attorney, Fairfield, California. B.A. 1969, Pennsylvania State University; J.D. 1981,
LL.M. 1986, McGeorge School of Law, University of the Pacific. Member of the California Bar.
1. Rev. Rul. 83-46, 1983-1 C.B. 16.
2. An "overriding royalty" is created from the working interest and entitles the owner
to a specified fraction of production without the burden of development or operation costs.
The term of the overriding royalty is co-extensive with the term of the working interest.
F. BURKE & R. BOWHAY, INCOME TAXATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES j 2.05 (1982) [hereinafter
BURKE & BOWHAY].
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of capital" doctrine seems applicable. Under that judicially-created doctrine,- one who contributes services or property' to the acquisition, exploration or development of a mineral prospect in return for an economic
interest 5 in the mineral in place does not realize income immediately upon
receipt of that interest provided that he looks only to production from
that specific prospect for a return on his investment. Rather, the contributor realizes taxable income only if production is attained and after
his capital has been returned. The common law thus comports with the
layman's common sense view of what "income" truly is-namely, profit 6
-but in relation to service providers, to many the concept of acquiring
an "interest" for a "contribution" smacks too heavily of a carved-out exception to the general rule that income includes compensation for services.7
The doctrine is of immense historical importance to the development of
the petroleum industry in the United States.8 Its continued vitality re3. The pool of capital doctrine originated with the Supreme Court decision of Palmer
v. Bender, 287 U.S. 551 (1933). The I.R.S. fully adopted the doctrine in Gen. Couns. Mem.
22, 730, 1941-1 C.B. 214, and has reaffirmed it on numerous occasions, notably in Rev. Rul.
69-352, 1969-1 C.B. 34; Rev. Rul. 77-176, 1977-1 C.B. 77; and Gen. Couns. Mem. 38,906 (Oct.
6, 1982).
4. "Property" in this context includes money.
5. Treas. Reg. § 1.611-1(b)(1) (as amended in 1965) defines "economic interest" as
follows: "An economic interest is possessed in every case in which the taxpayer has acquired
by investment any interest in mineral in place ...and secures, by any form of legal relationship, income derived from the extraction of the mineral... to which he must look for a return
of his capital."
6. The concept that the recipient of an economic interest does not immediately have
income but only potentially has income was cogently stated by the Fifth Circuit in Estate
of Weinert v. Comm 'r:
This opportunity of converting a right to develop the possibility of oil into property is the only ownership of minerals that has tax significance; bare ownership in place of minerals 12,000 feet underground, or perhaps not there at all,
or if there perhaps not exploitable, has little if any real meaning-or should
have little meaning for income tax purposes. It is the development of this opportunity into producing wells having a present economic usefulness that results
in income values.
294 F.2d 750, 762 (5th Cir. 1961).
7. I.R.C. § 61(a) (1982 & Supp. III 1985); Treas. Reg. §§ 1.61-2(a) to -2(d)(1) (1960); see
Parker, Contributionof Services to the Pool of CapitaL GeneralCounsel Memorandum 22730
to Revenue Ruling 83-46, 35TH INST. ON OIL & GAS L. & TAX'N 313 (1984). In Gen. Couns.
Mem. 22730, the I.R.S. nevertheless generally included service providers to be covered by
the doctrine:
If the driller or equipment dealer is making an investment by which he acquires
an economic interest in oil and gas in place, expenditures made by him represent capital expenditures returnable tax-free through the depletion allowance
rather than by way of expense deduction, and the oil payment rights acquired
do not represent payment in property for services rendered or supplies furnished.
1941-1 C.B. 214, 221-22.
8. Arrache, in his article, Is Revenue Ruling 83-46 a "Duster"forService Contributors
Seeking "Tax Free"Pool of CapitalTreatment? 24 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 857 (1984) states:
FIun the early days of the industry, in oil and gas producing states such as
Oklahoma, Texas, and California, the person with a little cash, the prospector
with a little knowledge of geology, and the driller who owned a cable tool rig,
would come together to discover and to develop oil and gas producing wells.
All of them would share the joy of discovery or alternatively, the disappointment of loss in having produced a 'dry hole.'
As time went on, more and more specialists contributed their services,
as did the cash and equipment investor, to the 'pool of capital.' Added to the
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mains of crucial importance to hundreds of the small independent oil companies and wildcatters whose numbers comprise roughly 98% of the industry.'
The pool of capital doctrine was engendered by the courts to reflect
the economic realities attendant to drilling for oil and gas. 10A drilling venture is inevitably a highly expensive undertaking, fraught with danger
and uncertainty. Oil and gas deposits have always been extraordinarily
difficult to forecast and hence economic interests pertaining thereto are
enormously difficult to value prior to actual discovery. One who contributes to the formation of a reservoir of capital to permit the venture
to go forth will probably lose his investment." To require such a person
to immediately pay a tax liability on the basis of a value somehow attributed to his economic interest would be to discourage investment and
stifle production in an already depressed but most vital industry.
That is precisely the result promoted by Revenue Ruling 83-46, and
the entities standing to suffer most are the small operators. As a matter
of public policy, it is certainly arguable that whether the small operators
sink or swim should be a function of the market. It is also arguable that
it is not the proper province of the Internal Revenue Service to unilaterally
change that market and that, indeed, it is a proper function of the government to encourage private enterprise. The proclivity of the I.R.S. to exact
its tax revenues early may in the long run be counterproductive to the
promotion of a vigorous economy.
This article discusses Revenue Ruling 83-46 and explores possibilities
for the mitigation or circumvention of its tax effects through interpretations of section 83 and the use of alternative business associations such
as corporations and partnerships. The article specifically analyzes the
potential of the partnership relation in the light of current case law and
statutory authority and concludes that it is feasible to form partnerships
under the Uniform Partnership Act and sufficient for purposes of Subchapter K which would bypass the effect of the Ruling. Provided that such
business associations are otherwise formed for legitimate business purposes and not merely to avoid taxes, they should be afforded full recognition by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue and the courts. Until the
list of types of contributors were the services of the independent geologist/prospector, independent geologist/drilling advisor, geologist/corporation, petroleum
engineer, driller/drilling corporation, tax shelter promoter, attorney, accountant, landman/independent contractor, landman/employee, and the corporation
executive. Each contributed his services and each received an economic interest
in the property rather than a cash payment.
9. See Comm'r v. Engle, 464 U.S. 206, 218 n.16 (1984). Large oil companies are not,
relatively speaking, lacking in resources to conduct drilling projects. Typically, their preference
is to purchase numerous oil and gas leases and select the time for drilling during the various
lease terms. It is salutary to reflect that the pool of capital doctrine antedates many of the
"Seven Sisters" who comprise the giants of the industry and actually assisted in their growth.
10. The doctrine applies to the extractive industries generally, but the vast bulk of case
law emanates from the oil and gas field.
11. Some estimate that on average, fewer than one in thirty exploratory wells are productive. See Friske, Revenue Ruling 77-176Revisited, 28 OIL & GAS TAX Q. 147, 154 (1979).
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courts pass upon the ultimate validity of Revenue Ruling 83-46, oil and
gas lawyers would do well to consider alternatives to the nonrealization
of income within the pool of capital.
I. THE SUBSTANCE OF THE RULING

Revenue Ruling 83-46 describes three fact situations and holds that
the fair market value of overriding royalties received by the taxpayer in
each situation is included in gross income under section 83 of the Internal Revenue Code and its supporting relations. The Ruling also cites
Revenue Ruling 67-118"2 for the proposition that an overriding royalty
constitutes an economic interest in oil and gas. The fact situations involve
a corporate promoter, an attorney, and an employee of a closely-held
corporation.
In the first situation, a corporation syndicated partnerships that acquired interests in oil and gas properties. The corporation entered into
an agreement with one such partnership which provided that the corporation would acquire a royalty in consideration for its services in locating
available oil and gas properties for the partnership. Under the agreement,
the corporation received several such royalties in oil and gas to be produced from leases acquired by the partnership.
In the second situation, an attorney is retained by a corporation in
connection with its acquisition of oil and gas properties. The attorney examined titles to the properties and drafted lease agreements under which
the corporation acquired the minerals in place. The attorney and the corporation agreed that for each such lease that the corporation so acquired,
the attorney would receive a royalty in the oil and gas to be produced
under the lease.
In the third situation, an employee of a closely-held corporation was
responsible for corporate administrative and policy matters. His duties
included arranging financing to acquire and develop oil and gas properties located by the corporation's technical staff and overseeing the operations in developing the properties. For these services, the employee received a salary and a royalty in the oil and gas being produced from each
such lease acquired by the corporation.
Conspicuously absent from the Ruling is any reference to the pool of
capital doctrine or any I.R.S. authority interpreting it. Such absence was
intentional 3 and is especially significant coming on the heels of Revenue
12. Rev. Rul 67-118, 1967-1 C.B. 163.
13. See Parker, supra note 7, at 339 (citing Background Information Note (Dec. 16,
1982). This Note is available by request under the Freedom of Information Act and states:
In view of the length of time G.C.M. 22730 and Rev. Rul. 77-176 have been
outstanding, it would not be feasible to revoke them. Reference to G.C.M. 22730,
Rev. Rul. 77-176, and the pool of capital doctrine, has been intentionally omitted in the proposed revenue ruling in favor of related factual situations, though
sufficiently distinct from the G.C.M. and Rev. Rul. 77-176. It is believed that
this approach is the most effective way to accord compensatory arrangements
relating to the acquisition and development of oil and gas properties the same
tax treatment under Sections 61 and 83 of the Code as other compensatory
arrangements in which property interests are received.
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Ruling 77-176"1 and a series of letter rulings in which the Service continued
to hold that the doctrine does apply to the receipt of an economic interest
5
in return for the provision of services. Through careful delineations of
the bounds of the doctrine, the Service conceivably could have achieved
the same6 result in relation to the three fact situations discussed in the
Ruling.1
We are therefore left to speculate upon the Service's ultimate design.
At present it seems possible that the I.R.S. proposes to remove from pool
of capital treatment economic interests received by purely service pro7
viders to the acquisitionof oil and gas prospects, since all three Revenue
Ruling 83-46 taxpayers contributed services relating to acquisition as
14. Rev. Rul. 77-176, 1977-1 C.B. 77.
15. "[If an economic interest is received in a transmission that meets the requirements
of G.C.M. 22730, neither Section 61 nor Section 83 requires the inclusion of gross income
of the value of the economic interest received." Priv. Ltr. Rul. 8,047,005 (July 24, 1980);
Priv. Ltr. Rul. 8,129,006 (Mar. 30, 1981); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 8,137,006 (July 23, 1981).
16. In adopting the pool of capital doctrine in G.C.M. 22730, the I.R.S. set forth various
requirements which must be met before an economic interest transferred in exchange for
services can qualify for nonrealization treatment. They may be summarized as follows:
(1) The economic interest transferred must be in the identical property to which
the services relate;
(2) Such services must perform functions which otherwise would have to be
performed or paid for by the lessee;
(3) Prior to the performance of the services, the parties must agree that the
services represent a contribution of capital and that an economic interest, not
compensation or satisfaction of a liability, is expected in return. Title of the
interest itself need not be transferred at the outset if evidence of such an agreement is provided;
(4) The provider of funds, materials, or services must look only to his economic
interest for any possibility of recoupment or profit. If an alternative means
otherwise guarantees payment should the property fail to produce as desired,
no risk is involved and the resemblance to a true investor disappears;
(5) The nature and extent of the services to be provided must be definite and
determinable. If services are required on a continuing basis after the property
is developed, the interest received takes on the appearance of compensation.
See Parker, supra note 7, at 330; Hall, Contributionof Services to the Pool of Capita"Defining the Boundaries, 30 OIL & GAs TAX Q. 442, 445 (1982); see also Kirgis & Wilson, Tax
Aspects of Co-Ownership Interest in Oil and Gas PropertyReceived for Services: Terminal
(?) Condition of G.C.M. 22730, Part 1, 25 OIL & GAS TAX Q. 251, 254 (1977). In the case of
the corporate promoter, the I.R.S. could, for example, have reasoned that its services did
not relate to the acquisition of any specific property and hence were not definite and determinable. As for the attorney, perhaps the services he performed were not of the sort which
the lessee would otherwise have had to perform himself in developing the property. The
employee, for his part, is arguably not acting at his own risk because of the employment
relation.
17. Conceivably supportive of this possible trend is Cline v. Comm'r, 617 F.2d 192 (6th
Cir. 1980) (royalties received by taxpayers as compensation for services in negotiating coal
leases acquired by mining company taxable as ordinary income and not capital gain despite
a subsequent contract purporting to sell the interests in the coal to which the royalties pertained back to the company) (Note: Nonrealization within the pool of capital was not a litigated
issue); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 8,520,004 (Jan. 30, 1985) (Five percent working interest received by
geologist engaged in generating oil and gas prospects was subject to § 83 where he received
the interest as a result of the performance of services for others.). If the I.R.S. is indeed intending to remove contributions to the acquisition as opposed to the exploration or development of oil and gas prospects, such would do violence to the doctrine's history. See Shelton,
The Taxation of Oil and Gas InterestsReceived in Payment for Property or Services, 5TH
INST. ON OIL & GAS L. & TAX'N 385 (1954).

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1987

5

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 22 [1987], Iss. 2, Art. 10
Vol. XXII

LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

opposed to development or exploration. More fundamentally, it seems
plausible that the I.R.S. is reconsidering its position taken in G.C.M. 22730
with respect to services generally.'8 Since the Revenue Ruling 83-46 service providers are not drillers or equipment dealers, perhaps the I.R.S.
is moving toward the position that service providers who are not directly
enough associated with the actual extractive processes cannot qualify for
nonrealization treatment. If so, such a distinction might also exclude from
pool of capital treatment the services of the geologist who surveys the
land, the accountant who sets up the books, or the petroleum engineer
who plans the project. It is also possible, of course, that the ruling is at
the vanguard of a movement to do away with the doctrine altogether.' 9
If upheld by the courts, Revenue Ruling 83-46 will drastically affect
traditional means by which owners of oil and gas prospects have secured
the performance of services essential to the development of oil and gas
wells. The "corporate promoter" treated in the first fact situation bears
very close resemblance to the familiar lease broker who assembles the
blocks of leases, thus enhancing the value of the individual included leases
and maximizing the potential of obtaining drilling services. Attorneys,
for their part, for many years have not charged fees from relatively unmoneyed operators but instead have rendered services such as title clearing and lease negotiation in return for economic interests. 0 Admittedly,
the propriety of the doctrine's application in the employment context is
less certain but at least two commentators have endorsed its practice.2'
Surely, nevertheless, one however situated who makes a contribution to
the "pool" and profits only if production is attained must be distinguished
from one who receives an interest in property in discharge of a money
obligation. The latter person expects to be compensated for his services
irrespective of the success or failure of the drilling venture. The courts
will uphold his right to payment and will award a money judgment if he
is not paid. The former person, by contrast, only shares "ownership in
place of minerals 12,000 feet underground ...perhaps not there at all."2
II.

THE SCOPE OF SECTION

83

Under the pool of capital concept, the receipt of an economic interest
for services is neither a sale or exchange nor compensation income. The
service provider is properly viewed as a risk-sharer and investor as opposed to a worker for hire. Nevertheless, Revenue Ruling 83-46 seems to
18. See generally Parker, supra note 7.
19. It is the writer's observation that students of the pool of capital doctrine tend to
polarize into two factions: The "Linden" school and the "Dumas" school. William M. Linden's
article, Income Realization in Mineral Sharing Transactions:The Pool of CapitalDoctrine,
33 TAx LAW. 115 (1979) is essential reading, for it most ably advances the thesis that the

doctrine is entirely in consonance with general principles of income realization. The opposite
view is well presented by Bethany Dumas in her Comment, The Pool of Capital Doctrine
in Oil and Gas Taxation:Its Status UnderRevenueRuling83-46, 52

TENN.

L. REV. 291 (1985).

20. Read: "Have worked for nothing on the long chance that oil might be discovered."
21. See Hall, supra note 16, at 464-66; Glancy, CompensatingKey Employees in the

Oil and Gas Business, 33D INST. ON OIL & GAS L. & TAX'N 369, 373 (1982).
22. Weinert v. Comm'r, 294 F.2d 750, 762 (5th Cir. 1961).
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reflect the aim of the Internal Revenue Service to eclipse that view through
the medium of section 83. Under that section, the fair market value of
property received for services performed is included in the taxpayer's gross
income in the first taxable year in which the property is transferable or
no longer subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture.
At the outset, there is some question as to whether the Service's
reliance upon section 83 to accomplish the results announced in Revenue
Ruling 83-46 is justified for reasons of legislative history. Section 83 was
enacted as part of the Tax Reform Act of 1968 and was impelled by confusion associated with restricted stock plans used as deferred compensation arrangements. Stock transferred to employees would be subject to
a substantial risk of forfeiture and thus be virtually non-transferable
because it would revert to the employer if the employment relation ended
before a certain date.
By enacting section 83, Congress has ensured that the value of such
stock will be taxed when such restrictions are removed. However, the
legislative process has yielded a statute with broad-sweeping language
not apparently confined to restricted stock plans.2 3 Assuming that the
statute is nevertheless applicable in the context of oil and gas sharing
arrangements, 4 the lawyer should be cognizant of two concepts subsumed
within section 83 which, as appropriate, may operate either to defer or
accelerate the inclusion of gross income of the value of interests received
for services contributed to an oil and gas prospect.
A. "SubstantialRisk of Forfeiture"
Under section 83(a), income is included only when any restrictions
which constitute a substantial risk of forfeiture are removed. Section
831c)(1) specifically defines a substantial risk of forfeiture to exist where
23. See Anders, Section 83 as an Alternative, 23 OIL & GAS TAX Q. 67, 77 (1974), for
a discussion of the evolution of the present statute. Section 83(a) provides:
If in connection with the performance of services, property is transferred
to any person other than the person for whom such services are performed,
the excess of(1) the fair market value of such property (determined without regard to any
restriction other than a restriction which by its terms will never lapse) at the
first time the rights of the person having a beneficial interest in such property
are transferable or are not subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture, whichever
occurs earlier, over
(2) the amount (if any) paid for such property, shall be included in the gross
income of the person who performed such services in the first taxable year in
which the rights of the person having the beneficial interest in such property
are transferable or are not subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture, whichever
is applicable. The preceding sentence shall not apply if such person sells or
otherwise disposes of such property in an arm's length transaction before his
rights in such property become transferable or not subject to a substantial
risk of forfeiture.
I.R.C. § 83(a) (1982).
24. A "sharing arrangement" is a transaction where one party contributes to the acquisition, exploration, or development of a mineral property and receives as consideration
an interest in the property to which the contribution is made. See BURKE & BOWHAY, supra
note 2, 7.01.
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the taxpayer's rights to full enjoyment of the property depend upon the
future performance of substantial services by any individual. In other
cases, the question of whether there is a substantial risk of forfeiture
depends upon the surrounding facts and circumstances.25
Legitimate questions may be raised regarding whether the overriding
royalties received by the Revenue Ruling 83-46 taxpayers are subject to
a substantial risk of forfeiture. On the one hand, the taxpayers clearly
received present interests which presumably are in turn alienable. On the
other hand, valuing those interests is extraordinarily difficult because the
overwhelming statistical probability is that any given oil drilling venture
will not be commercially successful. 6 Arguendo, to the extent that an overriding royalty or other fractional working interest represents an interest
which likely will never be taken in kind, such an interest seems decidedly
subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture and hence should not be taxed
until the drilling project proves successful. It would seem, however, that
from the standpoint of the Service such a classification would be redolent
27
of the disfavored "open transaction" doctrine.
B. The Section 83(b) Election
Assuming that such a high likelihood of commercial failure does constitute a substantial risk of forfeiture, one option available to the taxpayer
would be to elect to be taxed currently under section 83(b). This election
must be made within 30 days of receiving the property interest and enables
the taxpayer to include in gross income the value of property measured
at the time he receives it irrespective of the substantial risk of forfeiture.
The mitigating effect of exercising the election is at once apparent should
the oil prospect turn out to be productive, because any appreciation in
value subsequent to the election would be taxable only when the taxpayer
disposes of the property. 8 The value of an economic interest almost always
will be lower prior to oil or gas discovery.
On the other hand, a potential disadvantage to the taxpayer is that,
should the interest indeed prove worthless and hence forfeited, no deduction is allowed in respect of such forfeiture. 9 Moreover, an election once
25. H.R. REP. No. 91-413, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 88, reprintedin 1969 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEws 1645, 1735; S. REP. No. 91-552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 121, reprintedin 1969
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2027, 2152-53.
26. As an illustration, 7,090 of the 9,242 exploratory wells drilled in 1975 were dry holes.
DAILY EXEC. REP. (BNA) 85, at G-5 (Apr. 30, 1976).
27. Burnet v. Logan, 283 U.S. 404 (1931), is the seminal case of the "open transaction"
doctrine. In this case, the Supreme Court held that where the consideration in the sale of
stock was based upon amounts of iron ore to be mined in the future, the value of that consideration could not be determined with "fair certainty." Hence, the taxpayer did not need
to report income upon the payments he received until the amount of the payments in the
aggregate exceeded his basis in the stock. The stated preference of the I.R.S. today is to
arrive at some present value. See Rev. Rul. 58-402, 1958-2 C.B. 15.
28. Treas. Reg. § 1.83-2(a) (1978). The character of the taxed appreciation would be capital
gain, but with the repeal of former I.R.C. § 1202, the 1986 Code has eliminated the tax advantage formerly given to capital gains as opposed to ordinary income.
29. I.R.C. § 83(b)(1) (1982).
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made may not be revoked except with the consent of the Commissioner.so
The election could therefore visit a particular hardship upon a taxpayer
whose interest becomes worthless when the drilling enterprise fails but
who is unable to take a loss deduction.
III.

ALTERNATIVE BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS

In relation to service providers, then, we should examine whether alternatives exist within the Internal Revenue Code to achieve the nonrecognition of income which apparently would be realized under the authority
of section 83 and Revenue Ruling 83-46. The most eligible candidates are
the provisions of Subchapter C relating to corporations and Subchapter
K dealing with partnerships.
A. Corporations
We might entertain the possibility that the service provider could contribute his services to a section 351 controlled corporation in return for
stock or securities of a value commensurate with the economic interest
he would otherwise receive. If feasible, the value of such stock or securities
would be received tax-free.
Section 351(a) provides that:
No gain or loss shall be recognized if property is transferred to
a corporation by one or more persons solely in exchange for stock
or securities in such corporation and immediately after the exchange such person or persons are in control (as defined in section 368(c)) of the corporation.
The control test under section 368(c and its supporting regulations is that
following the exchange the "control group" must own 80% of the stock
possessing at least 80% of the total combined voting power of all voting
stock and at least 80% of the total shares of all other stock. Unfortunately, section 351(d) specifically provides that, "[flor purposes of this section, stock or securities issued for services... shall not be considered as
issued in return for property." Hence, since a contribution of services does
not qualify as property under section 351(a), the service provider will
recognize as income the value of the shares received for services contributed to a controlled corporation. Moreover, section 351(f)(4) states as
follows: "For special rule in the case of an exchange described in this section but which has the effect of the payment of compensation by the corporation. ., see section 61(a)(1)." Section 61(a)(1) is the provision including
into gross income compensation for services. The corporation is therefore
not available as an adequate substitute for the pool of capital doctrine
in relation to the service provider. Income will be immediately realized
upon his receipt of stock."
30. Id § 83(b)(2).
31. See James v. Comm'r, 53 T.C. 63 (1969) (Held, value of stock received for service
to a controlled corporation taxable to recipient; concurrent transfer of property by another
person also taxable because he failed the 80% control test).
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B. Partnerships
During the previous major assault upon the pool of capital citadel
namely, Revenue Ruling 77-176,11 the partnership device was widely
employed and generally viewed as the only effective vehicle by which the
effects of that ruling could be entirely circumvented." In Revenue Ruling 77-176, the I.R.S. reaffirmed the pool of capital doctrine but restricted
its application in "obligation well farm-out" transactions: Where a driller
agrees to drill a well upon a lessee's land in return for an assignment of
the working interest, Revenue Ruling 77-176 holds that nonrealization of
income results only with respect to the drill site acreage as defined by
state law but not the surrounding ("outside") lease acreage. Similarly, it
would seem that, if a partnership valid for purposes of Subchapter K could
be formed to include the promoter, attorney, or employee, the effects of
Revenue Ruling 83-46 could be avoided. The parties would then allocate
among themselves in accordance with their
items of income and deduction
34
partnership agreement.
It must be observed, however, that the taxpayers featured in Revenue
Ruling 83-46 are very differently situated from the driller taxpayer involved in Revenue Ruling 77-176. First, they may fairly be classified as
"pure" service contributors; the driller, by contrast, contributes not only
his services but also considerable equipment and typically all drilling expenses. Also, notwithstanding that an overriding royalty is an interest
carved out of the working interest," it is not itself a working interest and
is of a sort often exchanged for services rendered and hence arguably
smacks of a compensatory arrangement. Finally, the holder of a royalty
oil interest for services is not a party to the joint cooperating agreement
as between driller and lessee; hence, he could not be a member of the tax
partnership" created by the joint operating agreement.
32. Rev. Rul. 77-176, 1977-1 C.B. 77.
33. See Linden & Manford, How to Avoid the New Ruling Which May Currently Tax
Oil and Gas "'Farmout"Deals, 47 J. TAX'N 76, 79 (1977); see also Burke, Taxation of Natural
Resources: Evaluationof Recent Changes and Projectionfor the Future with Special Emphasis on Oil and Gas Transactions,14 Hous. L. REV. 1075, 1080 (1977).
34. Allocations must pass the "substantial economic effect" test of I.R.C. § 704(b)(2)
(1982). Under the doctrine of Orrisch v. Comm'r, 55 T.C. 395 (1970), an allocation of a deduction to a partner has substantial economic effect only if he ultimately bears the economic
burden of the cost giving rise to the deduction. The subject of allocations is beyond the scope
of this article. The new Treasury Regulations under § 704(b) are extraordinarily detailed,
and a helpful reference to understanding how they operate is Professor Alan Gunn's article,
The Characterof a Partner'sDistributiveShare Under the "SubstantialEconomic Effect"

Regulations, 40

TAx LAW.

121 (1986).

35. BURKE & BOWHAY, supra note 2, 2.05.
36. A "tax partnership" refers strictly to a partnership created solely for tax purposes.
When a lessee and a driller join together to exploit an oil and gas prospect, a joint operating
agreement results. Such agreements constitute tax partnerships (sometimes called "partnerships by default") under I.R.C. § 7701(a)(2) (1982) unless an election is made under § 761(a)
and Treas. Reg. § 1.761-2(a) to be excluded from the application of the provisions of Subchapter K. Lessees and drillers who wish to avail themselves of pool of capital treatment
typically make this "election out."
Section 761(a) provides that the members of an unincorporated organization may, under
regulations prescribed by the Secretary, elect to be excluded from the provisions of Subchapter K, provided the organization is availed of "for investment purposes only and not

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol22/iss2/10

10

Curnow: Coping with Revenue Ruling 83-46: Exploring Alternatives to the P
1987

REVENUE RULING

83-46

If the partnership alternative is available to the taxpayers treated in
Revenue Ruling 83-46 (as well as various other types of service providers
to an oil and gas prospect 1 ) it would seem that a legal partnership as
formed in accordance with the Uniform Partnership Act would be
preferable to the tax partnership. By means of formal instruments creating
the partnership entity with its own set of books, transferring all subject
oil and gas properties to it, and providing for capital accounts, liquidation rights, and special allocations, such arrangements could help solidify
a taxpayer's position under I.R.S. scrutiny. The question remains,
however, whether this alternative is available.
1. "Capital" vs. "Profits"Interests. Section 721(a) is the "nonrecognition" statute for partnerships which is analogous to section 351 relating
to controlled corporations. This statute provides that "[n]o gain or loss
shall be recognized to a partnership or to any of its partners in the case
of a contribution of property to the partnership in exchange for an interest
in the partnership."
Again, "property" under this statute does not include servicespresumably because services are ephemeral and difficult to recognize as
representing an identifiable continuing investment in the business of the
partnership. But section 1.721-1(b)(1) of the Regulations features the
following language:
To the extent that any of the partners gives up any part of his
right to be repaid his contributions (as distinguishedfrom a share
in partnershipprofits) in favor of another partner as compensation for services (or in satisfaction of an obligation), section 721
does not apply. The value of an interest in such partnership capital
so transferred to a partner as compensation for services constitutes income to the partner under section 61.11
This provision is frequently cited for the proposition that there is a
distinction for tax purposes between a capital interest in a partnership
for the active conduct of a business" or "for the joint production, extraction or use of property, but not for the purpose of selling services or property produced or extracted." I.R.C.
§§ 761(a)(1), -(2) (1982).
Treas. Reg. § 1.761-2(a) specifies that:
(1) the participants must own the property, as co-owners, either in fee or under
lease or other form of contract granting exclusive operating rights;
(2) the participants must reserve the right to take separately their shares of
production in kind, though each may delegate authority to sell his share of
production for the time being for his account, but not for a period of time in
excess of the minimum needs of the industry and in no event for more than
one year; and
(3) the organization must not have as one of its principal purposes cycling,
manufacturing or processing for nonmembers.
See Treas. Reg. § 1.761-2(a) (1972). The election is made by attaching a statement to the
partnership return for the first taxable year for which exclusion from Subchapter K is desired.
See id. § 1.761-2(b)(2).
37. Each partner to a partnership must contribute either "capital or services." Comm'r
v. Culbertson, 337 U.S. 733, 740 (1949).
38. Treas. Reg. § 1.721-1(b)(1) (1960) (emphasis added).
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and a profits interest.9 One who receives a capital interest in a partnership in exchange for services past, present or future is being compensated
and realizes ordinary income per section 61(a). He would take a cost basis
in the partnership interest equal to the amount he includes in gross income, and such compensation would be treated by the partnership as a
0
guaranteed payment under section 707(c).1 However, the parenthetical
partnership profits" suggests
in
share
language "as distinguished from a
by negative implication that one who contributes services for a profits
interest will qualify for nonrecognition treatment. This interpretation is
justifiable on practical considerations:
First, the valuation of a profits interest would be a particularly
difficult task, similar in many respects to valuation problems
which Congress, the courts, and the Service have carefully avoided in other contexts. Furthermore, if a service partner were taxed
upon the receipt of a profits interest, he might be taxed again on
the same profits as they are realized by the partnership and included in his distributive share. Of course, the income taxed to
the service partner on the receipt of his profits interest would be
includible in the basis of his interest, but there is no recognized
procedure for amortizing this basis, or otherwise recovering it,
prior to the dissolution of the partnership or the sale of the interest. Thus, the service partner might wait years to recover his
basis.4'
Taxpayers arguing this position, however, are only able to cite as
primary authority the dictum found in a footnote in the 1965 Tax Court
case of Hale v. Commissioner: "Under the regulations, the mere receipt
of a partnership interest in future profits does not create any tax liability."42 Hale itself did not deal with the receipt of a partnership profits
39. The distinction between an interest in profits and an interest in capital was given
by the Advisory Group on Subchapter K: "An interest in the capital of a partnership can
be distinguished from a profits interests in that the former conveys a right to receive a specific
share of the partnership property in a distribution of property upon liquidation of the partnership operation." Hearingon Advisory GroupRecommendations on Subchapters C, J and
K of the InternalRevenue Code Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 86th Cong.,
1st Sess. 54, 141 (1959).

40. I.R.C. § 707(c) provides:
GUARANTEED PAYMENTS-To the extent determined without regard to the income of the partnership, payments to a partner for services or the use of capital
shall be considered as made to one who is not a member of the partnership,
but only for the purposes of section 61(a) (relating to gross income) and, subject to section 263, for purposes of section 162(a) (relating to trade or business
expenses).
I.R.C. § 707(c) (1982). Where a partner contributes capital or basic services, he may not be
satisfied with a mere share of partnership profits or losses but may want a fixed payment.
Under this provision, he would include the amount of that payment under § 61(a) and the
partnership would deduct it per § 162(a).
41. W. McKEE, W. NELSON, & R. WHITMIRE, FEDERAL TAXATION OF PARTNERSHIPS AND
5.05[21, at 5-24 (1977).
PARTNERS

42. 24 T.C.M. 1497, 1502 n.3 (1965) (citing Treas. Reg. § 1.721-1(b)(1)). They should also,
however, give serious thought to citing the U.S. Solicitor General's statement in his opposition to the petition for certiorari filed in the Supreme Court in United States v. Frazell, 339
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interest but rather with its sale, which was deemed to result in ordinary
income to the taxpayer because the consideration received was merely in
anticipation of future ordinary income. 3 Nevertheless, scholars for years
have assumed that a partnership profits interest can be acquired for services without tax consequences." The service partner was thought to
recognize income only as his distributive share of partnership profits was
earned by the partnership. Two cases have cast some doubt upon this proposition, however.
5
2. United States v. FrazelL In this first case, United States v. Frazel,'
the taxpayer, a geologist, contracted in 1951 to contribute exploration
services and maps to an oil company partnership and another investor
in return for a monthly salary, expenses, and stated interests in oil and
gas properties after the properties had been developed and after the partnership and individual investors had recouped their costs and expenses.
Prior to recoupment, the original contract was terminated and the parties transferred their interests to a new corporation. Frazell in 1955 was
issued about 13% of the stock of this corporation, worth $91,000.6
Frazell contended that the stock was either received in a tax free exchange to a controlled corporation per section 351 or, in the alternative,
received tax free in accordance with the pool of capital doctrine. The Fifth
Circuit rejected both contentions, citing section 1.721-1(b)(1) of the
Treasury Regulations, which provides that "the value of an interest in
such partnership capital... transferred to a partner as compensation for
services constitutes income to the partner under Section 61.-47 The court's
rationale was that Frazell had in substance received a 13% partnership
interest in return for his services, which interest either became possessory
immediately upon termination of the original contract in 1955 or else the
stock was issued to him for the partnership interest "originally contemplated."48 Either interpretation results in ordinary income to the taxpayer.
We must therefore question whether Frazell refutes the proposition
that a profits interest can be transferred tax free. The authorities have
split, but perhaps Kirgis and Wilson have the true moral of this story:
[T]here is a difference in opinion as to what rights Frazell actually had. Some have determined that Frazell's interest was a profits interest. Others would say that you must distinguish between
a present transfer of an interest in property subject to certain
restrictions and a future transfer of an interest in property upon
F.2d 885 (5th Cir. 1964). In arguing that the taxpayer did not receive income in a certain

year, the Solicitor General, representing the I.R.S., advocated that the receipt of an interest
in partnership profits is not taxable. See infra note 50.
43. 24 T.C.M. at 1503.
44. See, e.g., 1 A. WILLIS, J. PENNELL, & P. POSTLEWAITE, PARTNERSHIP TAXATION §
27.02 (3d ed. Supp. 1986).

45. 335 F.2d 487 (5th Cir. 1964).
46. Id at 488-89.
47. Id at 489 (citing Treas. Reg. § 1.721-1(b)(1)).
48. Id at 490.
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fulfillment of certain conditions.... [Aind while Frazell probably
reached the right result, the decision necessarily leaves tax advisors in a quandry. Careful draftsmanship will be necessary to
insure that the interest intended to be transferred is actually
transferred in the view of the Service and the courts. Only this
can circumvent the potential ability
4 9 to recast the transfer in a light
less favorable to the taxpayer.
It would seem that Frazell's interest did not become possessory until
1955, at which time it suddenly attained an ascertainable value. If the
partnership had become a formal partnership in 1951 with Frazell acquiring his (profits?) interest at that point, it is possible that a different result
would have been reached. 0 But perhaps an even greater obstacle to the
tax-free receipt of a partnership profits interest for services is represented
by Sol Diamond's clumsy attempt to convert ordinary income into capital
gain on a routine real estate transaction.
3. Diamond v. Commissioner.In this case,5' Diamond was a mortgage
broker who agreed to obtain a mortgage loan for the full price of a building
to be purchased by Kargman. In exchange for his services he was to receive
a 60% share of the profit or loss derived from the ownership or sale of
49. Kirgis & Wilson, Tax Aspects of Co-Ownership Interest in Oil and Gas Property
Received for Services: Terminal (?) Condition of G.C.M 22730, Part 2, 25 OIL & GAS TAX
Q. 441, 447 (1977).
50. See Burke, How Should An Economic Interest Acquired for Services be Treated
AfterRev. Rul 83-46? 58 J. TAX'N 352, 353 (1983). Frazell petitioned unsuccessfully to the
Supreme Court for certiorari. In a footnote in his opposing brief, the Solicitor General expanded on the meaning of Treas. Reg. § 1.721-1(b)(1) in its application to Frazell:
Moreover, even if the taxpayer had only a net profits interest, that would
still not shield him from taxation on the transfer of that interest to the W.W.F.
corporation in exchange for its stock. The most it would mean is that Frazell
would not have been taxed on the net profits interest at the time he "received"
it (November 1955, the end of the payout period), but only as the partnership
profits were actually earned over a period of time. But while the receipt of a
bare right to future income (i.e., the net profits interest) may not be a taxable
event, the present realization of that income through an anticipatory sale of
the right plainly is such an event. Accordingly, the value of the W.W.F. stock
is no less taxable when received by the taxpayer in exchange for a net profits
interest in the partnership than it would be when received in exchange for an
executory interest in the partnership capital, as discussed above.
Cowan, Receipt of an Interest in PartnershipProfits in Considerationfor Services: The Diamond Case, 27 TAX L. REV. 161, 184 (1972) (quoting Brief for the United States in Opposition at 10 n.3, United States v. Frazell, 335 F.2d 487 (5th Cir. 1964) (No. 20758) (emphasis
added)). Cowan remarks as follows:
If Frazell had had a profits interest as he claimed and if it were taxable
when he received it, the government could have lost the case, because the taxable event would have occurred several years prior to the one before the court
and at a time when Frazell's interest had little or no value in excess of what
he paid for it. By arguing that a profits interest was not taxable when received,
the Solicitor General was attempting to convince the Supreme Court that
Frazell's claim to a profits interest was irrelevant to the proper disposition
of the case.
Thus, the Solicitor General, representing the Internal Revenue Service
before the Supreme Court, adopted the consensus viewpoint.
Id at 184-85.
51. Diamond v. Comm'r, 56 T.C. 530 (1971), affd, 492 F.2d 286 (7th Cir. 1974).
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the building. Diamond arranged for the financing and shortly afterward
sold his interest to Kargman for $40,000, which he reported as a short
term capital gain. This gain was offset by unrelated short term capital
loss, and hence Diamond ostensibly had no tax consequences on the sale.
The Tax Court, however, rejected his claim that the parenthetical language
of section 1.721-1(b)(1) made this a non-taxable event and found that the
interest on date of sale had a market value of $40,000. Stating that the
parenthetical language was not explicit enough ("opaque") to give operation to the section 721 nonrecognition provision, the court also asserted,
"[Wihat is plain is that the regulations do not call for the applicability
of section 721 where a taxpayer has performed services for someone who
has compensated him therefor by giving him an interest in a partnership
that came into being on a later date."5
The Seventh Circuit affirmed. 3 Although noting "a startling degree
of unanimity" among the commentators that a partnership profits interest
in return for services was not taxable at the time of conferral and expressing concern that
[slurely in many if not the typical situations
it (a profits interest)
4
will have only speculative value, if any.
But in the absence of regulation, we think it sound policy to
defer to the expertise of the Commissioner and the Judges of the
Tax Court, and to sustain their decision that the receipt of a profitshare with determinable market value is income. 5
Diamond has been roundly criticized, 6 but the lawyer seriously considering the partnership vehicle for purely service providers to oil and gas
prospects must take care to distinguish his clients' situations from that
52. Id. at 546.
53. Diamond v. Comm'r, 492 F.2d 286 (7th Cir. 1974).
54. Id at 290.
55. Id. at 291.
56. Probably no commentator had any greater contact with the case than Martin B.
Cowan, who, while associated with the New York City firm of Wien, Lane & Malkin, personally observed the metamorphosis of Diamond, as it proceeded through the courts and
who discussed the case with the lawyers involved:
Unfortunately, the Seventh Circuit rationale is as difficult to justify as
the Tax Court's. None of the parties had pointed out to the Tax Court in their
briefs the position of the Solicitor General in Frazel4 the prior statement of
the Tax Court in its own Hale decision, the apparent conflict in result between
Hale and Diamond,or the unanimity of opinion among the commentators (including some who were known to have participated in drafting the regulation).
However, the Seventh Circuit did have this information before it when it
rendered its decision, and one hardly can accept at face value the Seventh Circuit's assertion that the Government had never taken a contrary position. The
statement of the Solicitor General in a brief filed with the United States
Supreme Court on behalf of the Internal Revenue Service by itself stands
witness to the contrary.
Moreover, it was apparent to those familiar with the internal workings
of the agencies involved that the IRS did not arrive at its position in the Diamond case through any pre-planned review of policy. The main thrust of the

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1987

15

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 22 [1987], Iss. 2, Art. 10
LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. XXII

case. Hopefully, the Diamond result will obtain only in situations where,
as in the case itself, services are performed prior to the formation of the
partnership and before the profits interest has a clearly ascertainable
market value57-as Diamond's was when he actually sold it. Regrettably,
the Treasury Department has not yet deigned to promulgate new regulations under section 721 which would clarify the situation.
C. A Prescription
Based upon the present state of the law, it would seem that the current taxation of overriding royalty interests received in return for services
invested in oil and gas prospects could be avoided by forming partnerships including the service provider if the following constraints are observed.
First, partnerships thus formed should be created by written instruments which clearly detail the subjects of capital accounts, liquidation rights, and allocations of income and deduction. The partnership entity should have its own accounting books. Rigorous adherence to these
formalities will amplify the parties' intent to be a partnership for tax and
all other purposes.
Second, the partnership interest conveyed to a service provider should
be a profits interest only, as the rules are explicit that the transfer of a
capital interest will yield recognition of income."
Third, the partnership should be formed before completing surveys,
negotiating leases, or acquiring oil and gas properties. By doing so, the
taxpayer should be able to discourage I.R.S. assertions that the partnership is merely a device designed only to thwart Revenue Ruling 83-46.
Fourth, the service partner's services should be performed subsequent
to the creation of the partnership, but his profits interest should be conveyed to him before acquiring property because, at that time, the profits
interest should have an unascertainable value. Also, if the profits interest
is received after performance of services, it arguably takes on the appearance of compensation. Moreover, the service provider should be cognizant that an attempt to quickly alienate his interest could suddenly result
in that interest attaining an ascertainable market value-especially if he
actually sells it as did Sol Diamond.
IRS in the Tax Court was that the arrangement in Diamond was not a bona
fide partnership, but an association, trust, or other relationship. The attorney
who made the argument in the Tax Court appeared to have thrown the profits
interest point into his brief as an afterthought, in the heat of battle and without
a thorough job of research.... And during the pendency of the appeal in Diamond this writer personally discussed the issue with the various Treasury
Department representatives ....
who denied that the issue had ever been
specifically considered by the Treasury Department.
Cowan, G.C.M. 22730 and Subchapter K: What Choice for the Driller? 26TH INST. ON OIL
& GAS L. & TAX'N 353, 380-81 (1975) (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).
57. See Burke, supra note 50, at 354.
58. Treas. Reg. § 1.721-1(b)(1) (1983).
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Lastly, it would seem that the service provider's services should be
of a continuous rather than fleeting sort in order to indicate his continuing interest in the partnership. Indeed, by requiring him to provide continuing services, the profits interest could become subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture, thus deferring the tax under section 83 in any event."
IV. CONCLUSION
It is dubious whether machinations such as those described above can
work a satisfactory alternative to the time-tested and -proven pool of
capital doctrine. Nevertheless, this article has attempted to suggest that
it is possible to thread the needle between Frazelland Diamond to achieve
nonrecognition treatment on the assignment of a partnership profits interest. The oil and gas lawyer might consider this alternative in an appropriate case.
Happily, the Internal Revenue Service has not yet indicated an intent to challenge the pool of capital doctrine as it relates to contributions
of cash and equipment to exploration and development in exchange for
economic interests. Moreover, a partnership capital or profits interest conveyed in exchange for cash or equipment would, under section 721, receive
nonrecognition treatment as well. Where possible, service contributors
should consider escalating their contributions to include cash or equipment.

59. See I.R.C. § 83(c)(1) (1982); cf Arrache, supra note 8, at 897: "[I1n abundance of
caution, one might structure the partnership interest of the service contributor to contain
restrictions which provide for 'substantial risks of forfeiture' and against transfer in accordance with the guidelines of section 83 and the Treasury Regulations."

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1987

17

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 22 [1987], Iss. 2, Art. 10

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol22/iss2/10

18

